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Abstract
In this thesis, the author attempt to design a process that will help web
application development companies produce more secure services. This
is achieved by using a security standard relevant to the services these
applications provide. Throughout the course of this thesis, the author
attempts to highlight why this is needed, and how it will be achieved.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The result of this thesis is an application that uses a process designed to
help development companies implement more secure web applications.
One of the features of this process is providing information about security
and potential measures that can be taken from a relevant security standard.
Relevant in this case referring to what the process deems best suited
to solve any potential security threats a user might face, based on the
answers provided by this user. Throughout this thesis, the foundations
for this result will be introduced and explained. Questions such as "What
problem is this application trying to solve?" ,"How will this process help my
developers creating more secure applications?" and "Why use a standard
to help solve security related issues?" will be answered, and the necessary
background information on why these questions were made in the first
place will be revealed. The problem that this application tries to solve,
is the key problem and what this thesis is based on; "How can software
development companies create more secure applications?". A more in
depth problem statement and defined goals for this thesis will be given
in chapter 3.
Security standards provides a company with some benefits over
developing in-house measures against security related issues. One of these
benefits are that for certain standards, a certification by an accredited body
can be obtained. This means that a company could then inform their users
that all or some of the services they provide have been certified, meaning
that a user knows that any information they provide to these services are
being stored securely in some way. A different benefit is that a standard is
developed by a company or organisation with expertise specifically for the
area this standard is trying to cover, compared to a development company
that might not have any experience at all with handling the security issues
they might face after deployment. Using a standard basically allows a
development company to "borrow" the experience and expertise in a field
they might have none, from someone that does. However, standards can
be quite complicated and intimidating to use. Some standards spans over
hundreds of pages, and would take a significant amount of time for each
developer to learn. Certain ISO standards are so complicated that web
sites have been developed, dedicated solely to inform companies on how
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to implement them in their projects. One of these is the IsecT Ltd owned
web-site iso27001security.com.
The necessity of handling security properly is obvious when you look
at the amount of major security breaches in the last five years. One of the
companies that have experienced multiple breaches over the last years is
Sony. In November 2014, a major security breach was announced to the
public[3]. A group calling itself Guardians of Peace, or #GOP, attacked
Sony Pictures’ corporate systems. According to messages left behind by
this group, they had gained access to all of Sony Pictures’ internal data,
including personal data of Sony’s employees, and threatened to release it to
the public. What followed was a leak of several unreleased films, one being
the blockbuster movie called Fury, starring Brad Pitt, and the cancellation
of an, at the time, unreleased film named "The Interview". This film would
eventually be released a month later. How such an attack was possible have
been the source of rumours since it was announced to the public. What is
known is that the attackers managed to install a malware on Sony’s servers,
known as the Destover[25], allowing them to completely erase any content
found on the hard drive they are installed on.
This breach was not the first security breach Sony have experienced.
In 2011, the Sony PlayStation branch suffered a security breach. While
the breach at Sony Pictures in 2014 affected only their internal structure
and employees, the PlayStation Network breach resulted in a total of 77
million compromised user accounts[4]. These accounts contained real
names, addresses, birth dates, user names, passwords and even possibly
credit card data. The research director of SANS Institute, Alan Paller, said
that Sony most likely did not spend enough time and resources on security
when they developed the software that the PlayStation Network runs on.
SANS Institute is a major actor in security related work and according
to their website is "the most trusted and by far the largest source for
information security training and security certification in the world"[26].
Paller suspected that the perpetrators gained access to the network using
malware, similar to what happened in the 2012 breach. This malware were
installed on a system administrator’s computer via an email.
These examples show that even a major company, whose budget reside
in the billions (US Dollars), struggle to protect their services, networks and
the data found on these networks. This thesis aims to provide assistance
to help solve this problem by using security standards relevant to software
development.
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1.1 Structure of this thesis
The structure of this thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 highlights the problem statement, scope for this thesis
and the chosen research method, while chapter 3 contains background
information that the author deems relevant to the goals of this thesis. The
stakeholders of this thesis are described in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 and 6 describes the artifacts of this thesis. The process,
followed by the application. 7 is a short summary over the technology
used to implement the application, and chapter 8 shows a demonstration
of the application that was eventually used in the evaluation.
The following 4 chapters are the evaluation chapters, starting with a
description of the evaluation plan, followed by the evaluation environment
and chapter 11 shows the results of the evaluation. Chapter 10 describes
what possible threats to reliability might affect the outcome of the
evaluation.
The last chapter of this thesis is the conclusion. This chapter also
contains a section describing any potential future work.
3
4
Part I
Foundations
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Chapter 2
Problem statement & research
method
The information provided in the introduction gives some insight into some
of the security related problems companies face today. Some of these
problems are related to management; employees not being careful enough
when opening emails, or disgruntled former employees that still have
access to systems they should not have access to. Other security related
issues happen due to poor programming when developing both private
and public services.
Problem statement This thesis aims to design a process that can help
development companies reduce the risk of security breaches or other
security related issues, by providing security measures taken from security
standards to help prevent these breaches or minimise the damage they can
inflict.
2.1 Scope of this thesis
For evaluation purposes, the scope of this thesis is narrowed down to web
application development companies, and the security related issues they
face during development. This means that the certain parts of the process
will be written specifically with web applications in mind. Details about
how the process is tailored towards web application will be given in the
chapter 5. This scope helps define the goals of this thesis.
2.2 Goals of this thesis
Listed below is an overview of the goals of this thesis.
1. Evaluate whether or not development companies spend enough time
on security before deploying a web application to the public.
2. Design a process that can be used early in the planning stages of a
development project.
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3. Provide security measures from a standard deemed relevant by the
process.
4. Allow the process to be expanded upon, providing more coverage.
5. Develop an application that implements this process in an efficient
manner.
6. Reduce the complexity of using security standards in development.
First goal The first goal is important to this thesis, as the idea of
introducing security at an early stage is what the process and application is
built upon.
Second goal The second goal is the suggested solution to achieve the
first goal; creating a process that can be used as early as possible, before
any form of implementation has begun, to make it easier for development
companies to implement more secure web applications. This would help
companies spend more time on security before deployment happens, and
in turn possibly reduce the risk of a security breach.
Third goal The third goal is mentioned in the problem statement.
Throughout the process, the user will encounter various questions that
help the process determine what security standard are relevant to this user.
This standard would then present any security measures that could help
secure a user’s project. Relevant in this context means that the security
standard that were chosen, contains measures that can be taken to make the
project more secure. One important part of this goal is that the process does
not aim to provide any form of certifications of these standards. A more
detailed description of standard certification will be given in the chapter 3,
background.
Fourth goal The fourth goal is important to make sure the application
and process stay relevant, as new security leaks are discovered. Coverage
refers to adding more security standards or newer revisions to the process,
giving users a wider array of potential projects that can use the application.
Fifth goal The fifth goal is the application that implements this process.
Efficient refers to providing a user with a clean graphical user interface that
provide enough help to allow an in-experienced user of this application to
complete the process, without having to ask an already experienced user
for help.
Sixth goal The sixth and final goal aims to enable more companies access
to security standards by reducing the complexity of them. Reducing
the amount of information presented to a user, by stripping away any
information not relevant to a specific project should lower the difficulty of
implementing a security standard into a company’s development structure.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the iteration process for each artifact in this thesis
2.3 Research method & evaluation strategy
Before any work were done on the thesis itself, a problem analysis were
written. This problem analysis contained information such as the objective
of the thesis, as well as the stakeholders and success criteria for the
suggested artifacts found in this analysis. This information served as a
foundation for most of the work done in this thesis.
The artifacts that were made for this thesis is the result of several
iterations performed on the original artifacts found in the problem analysis.
Most of these iterations happened after discussion that occurred during
meetings between the author of this thesis and the author’s supervisors.
For each iteration, these meetings served as an evaluation of the current
artifact, which helped shape the artifacts. Figure 2.1 shows a simple
overview over this process. This figure is based on figure 5 on page 15 in
the 2007 report written by Ida Solheim and Ketil Stølen for SINTEF, named
"Technology Research Explained"[27].
Ideally, there would be a proper evaluation with a suited evaluation
strategy for each iteration, and the respondents would have not have any
connection to the author. When these meetings were held, the artifacts had
not reached a stage where an evaluation like this would provide enough
results to warrant the time investment. The final evaluation is therefore the
only evaluation where the chosen evaluation strategy have been used.
As this thesis aims to design an application to help solve the problem
statement, a practical evaluation strategy would be the best fit to help
determine whether or not the goals of this thesis have been met. The
evaluation of the application presented in this thesis will consist of a
field study, combined with a qualitative interview at a major software
development company in Oslo, that specialises in web applications.
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2.3.1 Reasoning behind chosen evaluation strategy
A field study and a corresponding qualitative interview is a good fit for
the thesis, as well as using non-empirical evidence. This is because the
environment in which the field study will be conducted provides a good
foundation for evaluating all the goals of this thesis. Combining the
observation with a interview allows for a direct evaluation of how well
the goals of this thesis are met. This environment will be described in the
evaluation chapter.
2.3.2 Suitable alternatives to chosen evaluation strategy
There were other alternatives to a field study that could been used for
the evaluation. Some of these potential strategies were described in
J.E. McGrath’s "Groups: interaction and performance", written in 1984.
8 different strategies were divided into four groups, depending on the
evaluation environment and if it is a theoretical or a practical evaluation
strategy. Of these 8, the most relevant to this thesis apart from the two
already chosen, would be to a field experiment or with non-empirical
evidence.
A field experiment is similar to a field study, major difference being
a field study interferes as little as possible with the evaluation during
observation. A field experiment uses a natural environment, but in stead
of simply observing, the observer can intervene or manipulate certain
elements of the evaluation to affect its outcome. By doing this, certain
situations that might not occur naturally with the given respondents, could
happen. A possible example would be to offer a security standard that
might not be relevant, to observe how a respondent would react, and how
much he or she would "trust" the application to present the user with the
best suited standard for his or her project.
Non-empirical evidence refers to presenting strength and weaknesses
of the artifacts, based on logical reasoning. Important factors would be
the observers experience with the services the artifacts provide, such as the
given security standard or how an average user reacts to a step-by-step
process encountered in the prototype application.
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Chapter 3
Background & state-of-the-art
Mentioned in the first chapter were two separate security breaches that
occurred at two different departments at Sony. This chapter will introduce
some of the potential measures that Sony could have taken to maybe
prevent these incidents from happening in the first place. "‘Maybe" being
a keyword here, because making sure something is 100% secure is close to
impossible. What these measures are designed to do is to reduce the risk of
a breach happening, through the use of specific development processes, or
applications designed to analyse a project to discover any possible security
related issues.
Both of the security breaches mentioned in the introduction happened
due to multiple reasons. Both attacks were so successful because the
attackers managed to install a malicious piece of software on a server or
multiple servers located inside Sony’s network. How the Trojan Destover
malware got installed during the 2014 breach is not entirely clear, but
the malware used for the 2011 attack got installed by accident via an
email sent to a system administrator. The amount of data that got stolen
during the 2011 attack were so high, that this breach was reported as being
one of the largest ever security breaches. Alan Paller, mentioned in the
introduction, said that part of why this attack was so devastating were due
to sloppy development practices that were allowed to take place because
Sony rushed their products. This reduced the amount of attention given to
security during development, allowing products with error-filled code to
be deployed. This code were then exploited to gain access to information
not intended for the general public.
This chapter looks at the current processes and security standards that
have been developed to help prevent situations like these from occurring,
and how they can be related to the goals of this thesis. The conclusion of
this chapter contains a summary of how the listed processes and security
standards match up with the goals of this thesis, and the gaps that the
artifacts of this thesis tries to fill.
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Figure 3.1: General overview of the waterfall method
3.1 Development model
A development model is a process that describes the life-cycle of a
development project, from inception to after deployment[32]. By using
a development model, companies can more easily define what work has
to be done during which phases. The "waterfall model", one of the
oldest development models, is based on fully completing a step before
continuing to the next step. A waterfall model is often divided into five
different steps, first step being the "Requirements" step and the last being
"Maintenance". Figure 3.1 show an overview over all 5 steps encountered
in the waterfall model. The V-model is a slightly more complicated version
of the waterfall-model, where a test life-cycle is performed alongside the
regular development life-cycle.
The way any waterfall-based model work is that once a step is
completed, developers can not go back to a previous step, making it
impossible to commit changes or fix any errors. This means that should any
of the initial requirements made during the first step be wrong, the project
have to start from scratch. Due to this strict nature, handling security issues
related to programming have to be done before the verification phase,
which requires a great amount of knowledge from the developers, as they
have to identify all possible threats related to the project.
At the opposite side of the spectrum is an “Agile model”. These models
are based on completing projects in iterations. The life-cycle itself can be
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very similar to a waterfall-model, the difference being that this life-cycle is
repeated several times during the course of a project. These repetitions
are often referred to as iterations. Agile allows developers to, as the
name might suggests, make changes to previous steps after they have been
initially completed. Combining an agile work flow with a minimum viable
product would allow developers to iron out security issues as they surface,
and then implement more features that would lead to additional possible
security related issues.
These development models are used in one of the development
processes that will be described in the following section.
3.2 Development processes
A method to prevent security issues is to design software to be secure
from the ground up. These theories are known by several different names,
such as "Secure by design"[9], "Secure programming" and "Defensive
programming"[10]. The idea is using good programming practices that
would prevent situations where bugs related to security could occur. This
approach put a lot of responsibility on each developer, as they would have
to be very experienced with the programming language that is being used
to develop with, in order to recognise situations where faulty programming
techniques could lead to potentially vulnerable systems, much like the
waterfall model. The problem with these theories is that while the idea
behind them are great, applying them in practice is difficult because
developers can not be expected to recognise every single possible situation
that can lead to a potential security issue. However, these theories can
serve as a good foundation for more in-depth processes that tries to help a
developer spot issues while programming.
Some development companies have implemented their own processes
specifically with security in mind, in an attempt to develop more secure
applications. Microsoft released in 2004 their first version of the Security
Development Lifecycle (SDL)[7]. SDL’s main goals are to reduce the
amount of security issues that arise due to design and programming, and
to limit the ramifications of any security issues that might still exist after
development. The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle process is a
multi-step process for creating secure applications using both risk analysis
and thread modelling to map security related issues. The process consists
of seven step, referred to as phases. Each of these phases have several sub-
steps that have to be completed before moving on to the next phase. From
start to end, the seven phases are "Training", "Requirements", "Design",
"Implementation", "Verification", "Release", "Response". These names are
similar to some of the stages encountered in both a waterfall model, as well
as an agile development model. One step of the "verification" phase, is
the “SDL practice #11: Perform Dynamic Analysis”. Microsoft themselves
have developed two different applications for this step; Application
Verifier and BinScope. The latter were built in compliance with SDL’s
requirements and recommendations. The BinScope application lets a user
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choose a file containing code from their project to analyse; the application
then scans this file and concludes with a report of which of the SDL
requirements that have been met and not met. What is not completely
clear is what programming language this software supports. There is a
version that is implemented in Microsoft’s Visual Studio, an Integrated
development environment (IDE)[28] used to help developers program
more efficiently. This suggests that any language supported by Visual
Studio can be analyzed, such as JavaScript and ASP .NET, which are both
used to create web applications.
Microsoft developed a guide for SDL that would help companies
integrate the security practices found in SDL into an agile development
environment. Each step in the different phases belong to one of three
categories; "every-sprint practices" are performed for every iteration of a
project, while "one-time practices" happen only once during the start of
a project. The third and final category is the "bucket practices"; this step
contains all practices that have to be completed on a regular basis, but
does not have to be done in each iteration. Should a company want to use
SDL alongside a waterfall model, then the process is a simple start-to-end
process that need no further explanation.
Microsoft’s Security Development Licecycle is a process that, by using
the theories of "secure by design" intent to prevent attacks from happening.
A different approach revolve around reducing the ramifications of a breach
if it happens, instead of outright trying to prevent them from happening
in the first place. The Information Security Management System, or ISMS,
is a set of policies for "systematically managing an organisation’s sensitive
data"[8]. ISMS main goal is to minimise risk and reduce the impact of a
security breach should it occur. SDL is a process that focuses on what a
developer can do while writing code to improve security; ISMS focuses
more on the management side of a company. It recognises that not all
security breaches occur due to an external source such as a hacker, but
sometimes comes from inside the company’s structure. Examples include
former employees that felt they had been treated poorly, or even current
employees. Internal security breaches can also occur by accident, with no
malicious intent. The Utah State University reported on February the 6th,
2015 that a staff member had accidentally sent an email message containing
347 individual names and social security numbers to a group of USU
student Veterans[29].
Some development companies choose to instead of adapting these
policies or processes to their own development and management practices,
they hire external advisers or companies that work with security related
issues in software development companies. The company that were used
to evaluate the artifacts of this thesis is a development company that, for
the project that was used in the evaluation, hired a security company to
come in after development had completed and analyse the application
for any potential security issues. This approach frees up the developers
time to focus purely on implementing the application according to their
requirements, and letting the advisers solve any security related issues after
development has reached a certain stage.
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3.3 Security standards & code of practice
A "high level" description of a standard is that it is a good way of doing
"something". Standards cover a vast amount of areas, ranging from
wireless Internet solutions, to electrical toothbrush recharge stations. One
of the major benefits a standard can provide is a certification. For an ISO
standard, this involves meeting the requirements set by a specific standard,
and then having a certification body (a third party company) come in to
verify these requirements[36].
A disadvantage with using a standard is the sheer size of some of
the standards that might be relevant to whatever a company is trying
to do. Some ISO standards span over a hundred pages. The language
used in some standards can also be quite complicated, which means that
any employees involved might have to read it two times or more to fully
understand the material.
This section will give an overview over some of the security standards
related to software development, as well as software development compan-
ies in general; namely ISO 27001, ISO/IEC 27002:2005 and OWASP.org’s
ASVS standard.
Mentioned in the previous section, ISMS is an approach to security
management. This practice were in 2005 implemented in the ISO/IEC
27001 standard[13], and subsequently deprecated in 2013, with the pub-
lication of the latest revision, ISO/IEC 27001:2013. The newest revision
changed some of its security controls, a term that will be explained later,
to better support newer technologies like "Cloud Computing". The 27001
standard focuses on management, providing a set of requirements to prop-
erly assess a company’s risks and how to prevent them in a step-by-step
process[15]. These requirements have to be first planned, then implemen-
ted and later on reviewed to improve them. A related standard is the
ISO/IEC 27002 standard. In the annex of ISO 27001, a number of secur-
ity controls are listed. These security controls refer to different areas in
a company’s structure that needs various policies related to security, and
are taken directly from the ISO/IEC 27002 standard. Examples include
"Information security policies", "Asset management" & "Supplier relation-
ships". ISO 27002 is a code of practice, rather than a full fledged certification
standard, and is often used in conjunction with ISO 27001[35]. Section 3.3.2
explain more about ISO 27002.
In short, the ISO 27001 standard tries to help an organisation define
an ISMS. One of the parts of the process in this standard is to select any
security controls and security control mechanisms. The ISO 27002 provides
the organisation with a number of potential security controls and security
control mechanisms that can be used to complete the ISMS. These controls
are what is listed in the annex of ISO 27001.
The "Standard of Good Practice" (SoGP)[16], published by the Informa-
tion Security Forum (ISF) is a guide providing information on identifying
and managing security risks. In 2011, SoGP was updated to cover the re-
quirements for an ISMS that were set out in the ISO 27001 standard.
In 2009, an organisation called Open Web Application Security Project
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(OWASP) released their first revision of a security standard called Applica-
tion Security Verification Standard (ASVS)[30]. This standard is the product
of a collaboration between the members of OWASP. The latest revision of
ASVS saw release in 2014, its first since the original release. The goal of
ASVS is to provide a basis for verifying a web application. Verify and veri-
fication is a word often used in relation to standards. In this thesis, the term
verified refers to if a development project meets the requirement found in
a security standard.
3.3.1 ISO 27002
ISO 27002 is a code of practice that is often used in correlation with
ISO 27001. The "security controls" found in ISO 27002 help user meet
the requirements that is set in ISO 27001. Defined in section 2 of the
ISO 27002:2005 standard, control is used as a synonym for safeguard or
countermeasure[37]. The 2005 edition, the one the author of this thesis
have access to, have a total of 11 security controls clauses. These clauses
contain a total of 39 main security categories. Each security category
contain a control objective, highlighting what needs to be achieved and one
or several controls that can be used to achieve this objective. The following
list shows these 11 clauses, and the number of security categories in each
clause. They are taken directly from the 2005 edition of ISO 27002, section
3.1:
• Security Policy (1)
• Organising Information Security (2)
• Asset Management (2)
• Human Resources Security (3)
• Physical and Environmental Security (2)
• Communications and Operations Management (10)
• Access Control (7)
• Information Systems Acquisitions, Development and Maintenance
(6)
• Information Security Incident Management (2)
• Business Continuity Management (3)
• Compliance (3)
As an example, some of the security categories found in the Access
Control security clause are "User Access Management" and "Network
Access Control." Some of these clauses bear little relevance to web
application development, such as the Security Policy clause. The control
objective states that it aims to "provide management direction and
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support for information security in accordance with business requirements
and relevant laws and regulations." (Section 5.1 of ISO 27002:2005).
However, other clauses contain categories that could be used in relation
to development, examples include the "User registration" category, where
some of the controls involve maintaining user IDs, granting users a written
statement of their access rights and requiring users to sign statements that
show they understand the terms of their access. (such as many of the Terms
& Conditions found in various applications and websites)
3.3.2 Application Security Verification Standard
The following sub-sections is an in-depth description of how the Applic-
ation Security Verification Standard is used in practice. This standard is
written in a more detail compared to the other standards mentioned in this
chapter, as it was chosen as the standard to be implemented for the evalu-
ation of this thesis.
The objective of the ASVS standard is to provide a basis for testing is
"to normalise the range in the coverage and level of rigor available in the
market when it comes to performing Web application security verification
using a commercially-workable open standard"[30]. What this means in
practice is that the standard tries to provide measures that are relevant to
the size of a project. In the ASVS standard, features and services a project
have implemented is referred to as security requirement areas, similar to
the security controls in the ISO 27001/27002 standard. Coverage refers
to how well a project manage to meet the security requirements found in
these areas. A smaller project should require fewer measures to achieve
an acceptable coverage, and a larger project require more measures. The
standard provides a user with help on how to determine the size of their
project. This is achieved by dividing the measures into different levels of
verification.
Level of verification
The level of verification is a term defined in the ASVS standard that help
describe the size of a project, and how much effort is needed to achieve
verification.
If an application meet all the requirements for a certain verification
level, then it would be considered an OWASP ASVS Level X application,
X referring to the level of verification for the project. ASVS operate with
4 different levels. The first, and easiest level to comply with is level 0,
known as "Cursory". The purpose of this level is to define that some form
of security review have been performed for the project. The ASVS standard
does not provide any requirements for this step, it is instead suggested that
a company define these themselves. Level 0 is not a prerequisite for the
other levels. What this means is that a project can skip level 0 and instead
go directly to level 1.
Level 1, named "Opportunistic", is the first level where ASVS provide
requirements that has to be met in order to achieve verification. The ASVS
17
standard reads that "An application achieves Level 1 (or Opportunistic) cer-
tification if it adequately defends against application security vulnerabilit-
ies that are easy to discover".
The second level is level 2, "Standard". This is aimed at applications
that require security against vulnerabilities that poses moderate-to-serious
risk. This can include services that handle money transactions such as web
shops, but also applications that process sensitive information like health
care or personal information about the companies employees.
The highest level of verification that can be achieved in this standard is
level 3, "Advanced". Projects that should strive for this level of verification
can include applications that in some form handle life and safety, such as a
control system for the traffic lights in a city, where any errors could lead to
vehicles crashing into each other or into pedestrians.
Once the verification level have been established, an overview of the
functionality the project will offer is required to proceed. This information
is used to define security requirements based on the verification level. The
security requirements are then divided into what the standard refers to as
security requirements areas.
Security requirement areas
The security requirement areas defined in the ASVS standard mostly
revolve around the functionality a project offers, or how this functionality
is implemented. Some of these areas are similar to the security controls
found in ISO 27002. Each of these areas have a different amount of
requirements that has to be met in order to achieve verification. The
amount of requirements depends on the chosen security level. A project
with a security level 1 would have to meet eight specific requirements in
order to achieve verification for the "Authentication" security requirement
area. A project with a security level of 2 would have to meet the same
eight requirements, and an additional eleven. In order to make it easier
to transition from older versions of ASVS, the original numbering scheme
have been kept from the previous versions. As of the 2014 revision, there
are 13 different security requirement areas. Below is a short description of
four of these areas.
V2. Authentication Authentication contain the requirements related to
log in/out services. Measures include ensuring that passwords field do
not echo the user’s password when it is entered, or that all credential and
identity information is properly encrypted.
V3. Session Management Sessions handle data that is temporarily stored
on the server. The information that is stored in a session object is subject to
the developer, but examples include passwords and answers given by users
to questions answered with radio buttons. During the implementation of
the application artifact in this thesis, sessions were used to allow users the
ability go back a step to change the answer to a question.
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An example measure for this area is to verify that sessions timeout after
a specified period of inactivity, a feature often implemented in Internet
banks.
V4. Access Control Access control contains requirements that are
related to authentication, and preventing users from accessing functions
or services which they do not have the require authentication to access.
Situations where this could occur is for services like email, where a user
should only have to access to his or her own emails.
V5. Malicious Input Handling Measures that are designed to prevent
users from inputting symbols, or even pieces of code into the web
application is found here. Unprotected forms can for example be used by
people with malicious intent to access a database, or even wipe out all data
found on a database. This is known as SQL-injection.
Remainder The remaining nine security requirement areas are
• V7. Cryptography at Rest
• V8. Error Handling and Logging
• V9. Data Protection
• V10. Communications,
• V11. HTTP
• V13. Malicious Controls
• V15. Business Logic
• V16. File and Resource
• V17. Mobile.
Notice how the numbers do not progress naturally, indicating how
some areas were either removed completely or merged with a different area
at some point during a revision of the standard.
3.4 Conclusion
The information found this chapter highlighted some of the current pro-
cesses out there that tries to make applications more secure. The Microsoft
Security Development Lifecycle is particularly interesting because it meets
two of the five goals of this thesis, namely the second and third goal. The
SDL process is used before any form of implementation have been done,
as well as during development and after deployment. It is a process that
stretches from inception to evaluation.
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The main issue with this process is that is is so extensive that a
company has to change their own development practices to accompany
the requirements made by SDL. The first step includes giving employees
training in what they refer to as "core security training", which basically
mean that a company have to send their employees on seminars to
learn about security. The process assumes that a company that wants
to implement it into their practices have employees that are already
experienced with security, such as threat modeling, secure coding, security
testing and secure design[31]. The second issue with SDL is that in order to
achieve the third goal of this thesis, the company has to determine what
security standard is relevant to their project and then find the relevant
measures, and this only partially achieves it as the goal states that the
process should provide the standard, and not the user.
Mentioned in section 3.2, ISMS tries to reduce the damage caused by a
breach by designing policies that can be implemented into a company’s
practices. Due to the sheer size of the standards that implements this
practice, such as ISO 27001, the inclusion of such a standard in the eventual
process was put on hold, as it simply was too complicated for a thesis
of this size. It is relevant to this thesis however, as the fifth goal aims to
create artifacts that in the future can be expanded upon to include more
standards. This would allow the process to not only offer measures related
to development, but also for structuring a web application development
company according to the requirements found in a ISMS standard. The ISO
27001 standard is not aimed at development project, but company policies
and structure in general. The second goal of this thesis specifically aims at
introducing a process early in a development project, which means that a
standard such as the ISO 27001 standard would have to be used in a way
that only included the project members. Just how well such a standard
could be implemented into this standard would have to be tried and tested
however. A more relevant standard would be the ISO 27002, as it provides
direct measures, or controls, to safeguard information and a users interest.
In order to best make use of it, several of the security clauses would have to
specifically filtered out to provide only the relevant results for a user that is
interested in web application development. In short, 27001 at this point do
not offer enough relevancy to what this thesis aims to accomplish related
to web application development. ISO 27002 will be used at various points
during this thesis as a demonstration of how a standard (or in this case a
code of practice) can be implemented into the artifacts of this thesis.
A standard that were well suited to this thesis however, is the ASVS
standard described in detail in section 3.2.1. This is the standard that
was eventually implemented into the process that this thesis produced.
The reason for this is that, as mentioned, it allows both larger and
smaller projects to achieve verification, as the measures complexity scale
in comparison to the size. Should the project grow, the level of verification
can simply be increased if needed. The standard itself is also easy enough
to understand, making it possible to implement into a rather simple
application.
What this chapter highlighted was that while there was a development
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process (SDL) that fit nicely with some of the goals of this thesis, it does
not cover all of them. The lack of a clear connection between the security
process and a security standard, means that in order to achieve the goals of
this thesis, a new process has to be made. Some of the information found
in this chapter helped define the success criteria for the artifacts presented
in part II.
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Chapter 4
Stakeholders
Using the information from the previous part of this thesis, the following
stakeholders have been created. These stakeholders represent the relevant
parties related to the current state of this thesis. Notable differences in this
chapter would be the description of the end user. The last goal of this thesis
notes that the artifacts should be expandable to include more standards.
Should the process implement a standard related to management such as
the ISO 27001 standard, then the end user stakeholder would also include
employees working in management, and a company’s needs might change.
This chapter will describe what each stakeholder represents and their
needs. Each stakeholders needs are defined in relation to the goals of this
thesis. Unless stated otherwise, process in this chapter refers to the artifact
process this thesis produced.
4.1 Company
The company stakeholder represents a development company that have
employees spending time developing web applications. The company
is interested in implementing the services this thesis provides into their
current development practices.
Needs
1. The process should be usable without having to re-structure a
company’s current development practices in a drastic manner.
2. The application that implements the process should be available on
Linux, Windows and OSX.
3. A company do not have to train their employees in how to use the
artifacts produced by this thesis.
Indications of needs being satisfied A company that wants to implement
the process into their current development practices should only need to
allocate time to complete it, some time before implementation has begun.
Any company that do not spend time before implementing would need to
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do so in order to use this process, but are not required to make any changes
outside of that to their development practices.
The application should be able to run on any operating software that
can run a modern web browser e.g. Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome,
Safari. This allows their employees to use the application on their operating
system of choice.
If a company can begin using the application immediately after
acquiring it, then the last need is satisfied.
4.2 End user
The end user is a person using the process. This is in most cases a developer
that will work on implementing a web application, but can also be someone
working in management e.g. a project leader. A project leader would use
this application to establish an overview over what measures are needed
for the project, much like a developer, but would not implement them.
Needs
1. The process is comprehensible.
2. The process suggests relevant security standard for the end user, and
any relevant measures from this standard.
3. The user do not require former knowledge about these security
standards to use the process.
4. The application allows an end user to see a previous run-through of
the process.
5. The application allows an end user the ability to jump back and forth
between each step in the process.
Indications of needs being satisfied Comprehensible means the process
should present the information in a an understandable way. An in-
experienced end user should not spend significantly more time than an
experienced end user.
As indicated in the conclusion of the previous chapter, some standards
are quite complex, meaning it can be difficult to evaluate whether or not it
is relevant to a user’s project. Making the process give suggestions should
save some time for the end user. This also include any potential measures
that this standard suggest an end user to implement. This also related to
the third need of an end user, which is taken from the last goal of this thesis.
Prior knowledge to a security standard should not be needed to complete
the process.
The application should allow an end user to either log in if they want to
store the results for the future, or simply use it without logging in to make
it as fast as possible. Allowing an end user access to previous run-throughs
means that if they for some reason have lost the results or are interested in
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them because they might be relevant to a current project, it should be easily
available if they were logged in while using the application. A potential
situation where this can occur is if a project that uses the ASVS standard
were deemed as a security level 1 sized project before implementation
begun, but during development grew to level 2, a user can simply increase
the security level on the previous run-through to retrieve all the additional
measures they need for the new security level.
At any point during the process, an end user should be able to jump
to a previous step if needed. A possible scenario include if a mistake was
made at some point that needs to be changed before progressing further.
This change should then be reflected in the results of the succeeding steps.
4.3 Designer
The designer is the creator of the process, and the developer of the
application that implements the process.
Needs
1. The designer needs an application that is easy to maintain, which also
makes it possible to further develop the application once a prototype
has been released.
2. The process has to be designed in such a way that it can be expanded
to include more standards
Indications of needs being satisfied The application project has to be
maintained with a version control application such as Git[2]. Document-
ation also has to be in place to allow a new possible developer to read
up on the structure of the program if needed. Each step implemented in
the process has to be separate to each other, allowing a developer to add
new standards and any relevant information or questions surrounding this
standard.
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Part II
Artifacts
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Chapter 5
The process
The process is what defines this entire thesis. Most of the background
information have been collected to build a foundation to design the best
possible process that meets the goals of this thesis.
This artifact is based on the idea that asking project related questions
at an early stage, before implementation, allows developer to more easily
produce secure web application. These questions are asked during a step-
by-step process, where the end user is asked several questions related to a
project, that takes little to no effort to answer. Most of these questions are
simple questions that can be answered with "yes", "no" or "uncertain". As
the process is aimed to be used early on during the life-cycle of a project,
these questions reflect that by not going into specific details, but rather aims
to highlight the general features of a project.
One of the key features of the process, which is described as the third
goal of this thesis, is that any security related measures or requirements
offered by this process, are taken from a security standard. The fourth goal
states that this process should also be expandable, by making it possible to
add support for more security standards. In order for any security standard
to be implemented into the process, they have to meet certain requirements.
5.1 Success criteria of the process
The success criteria of the process are based on the goals of this thesis.
These criteria, alongside the needs of the three stakeholders, will help
evaluate the success of the artifact.
1. The process provides an end user with standards related to their role
within a project.
2. An end user do not require any prior knowledge to any of these
security standards.
3. The process is precise enough to provide two different users from
the same project, sharing the same role, with close to identical
suggestions.
4. The process can be used before any implementation have begun.
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Figure 5.1: Where the process can be used in a waterfall method
The first criteria is similar to the third goal of this thesis, difference
being that the process should offer not only project related standards, but
standards related to an end user’s specific role within a project. These
standards should be presented in such a way that the message they convey
should be understandable for someone with no previous knowledge or
experience with them. This criteria is important because it allows the
process to be implemented into a company’s practice without requiring
their employees to undergo training related to these security standards.
Mentioned in section 3.4, Microsoft SDL’s first step in the first phase is the
core security training which means that all team members have to “attend
at least one security training class each year”[34].
In order to assure any users that the suggestions being offered are
relevant to their interests, the process should be designed in such a way
that two separate team members working on the same project, sharing the
same role, is offered the same suggestions. The way in which information
is gathered, and the formulation of the questions will play a big part in
achieving this. Any confusion from an end user can lead to less relevant
suggestions, due to misunderstanding the information, or questions, given
by the process.
Section 3.1 mentioned development models, and the figure showed the
example of a waterfall model. Using this example we can highlight where
the process should be used in a development project. Figure 5.1 contains
the same example, with the process included. At some point during the
requirements or design, the process of this thesis should be usable.
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Figure 5.2: An end user could hold multiple roles within a project, making
more standards relevant.
However, this does not mean that the process is useless outside of this
scope. If a company decides to use this process at a later stage, that is up to
them. This criteria simply defines that it must be usable at an early stage,
without excluding possible use later.
5.2 Process description
The following paragraphs will describe what the thought-process and
intention behind each step is.
Step 1 - User role step The overall goal of the general step is to establish
what kind of security standard might fit the current end user. This is
achieved by first asking what type of role this end user holds within the
project, allowing the process to more easily determine what type of security
standard might fit this end user’s needs. A single person could hold
multiple roles in a project, and this is taken into consideration during this
step. The team leader might work actively as a developer in this project,
which would make any development related standards relevant to this
person’s interest. This interaction is represented in figure 5.2.
Once a role has been established, the process would then ask questions
related to that role. A developer’s interest might not be the same as a team
leader or the project owner. If the end user is a developer, the process
would ask if the project is a web application project to help establish if the
ASVS standard is relevant to their interests. A team leader might be asked
if the company have implemented any form of security related policies. If
no, this would make any ISMS related standard relevant, such as the ISO
27001 standard.
Step 2 - Security standard step The second step builds on what the user
role step established, and presents the end user with a list of standards that
might be of relevance to the project. The second goal of the thesis states
that the process should present security measures from a standard that the
process itself deemed relevant, and this also matches the second need of an
end user. In order to keep the process as comprehensible as possible, only
one security standard can be selected during each run-through. This is to
prevent each step from being overly complicated, and contain too much
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information. Should an end user feel that more than one standard might be
of relevance, then the process would have to be completed more than once.
Once the user have either agreed with the suggested standard, or
chosen a better alternative, the process begins to map some of the relevant
information that is required to continue to the next step. This information
would be related to the scale of the project or how critical the data that is
being handled in the project is. This helps define the degree of security that
is needed, which some standards use to determine the amount of measures
that are needed. In relation to ASVS, this information would be used to
determine the level of verification described in section 3.3.1.1
ISO 27002 do not directly separate large projects from smaller ones, so in
order to best filter out security controls, the designer of the process would
have to fully understand the standard, and then add a custom designed
level of verification to each of these security controls, much like how ASVS
levels work. Due to time constraints of this thesis, the author were not able
to implement this in time. A potential solution would be to simply map the
security clauses in this step.
For a management related standard, this information might include the
number of employees that will be working on this project, any relationships
with external sources, or what privileges the employees have related to
security e.g. if they have access to any sensitive information.
Step 3 - Project step The third step’s goal is to establish all the necessary
information related to the project. The process first use the information
provided in the security standard step to suggest the degree of security
needed for this project, if required by the standard. Once an end user
have chosen this, the process asks a series of questions designed to map
the necessary information about a project. These questions are specifically
designed to fit the chosen security standard, and the amount of questions
would change accordingly.
For a project that chose ASVS, this step would be to map the security
requirement areas described in section 3.3.1.2. ISO 27002 would use this
step to map the security categories found in each security clause that was
mapped in the previous step.
Step 4 - Confirmation step The fourth step in the process is the easiest
step. Using the answers given in the project step, the process suggest
which security controls are relevant to the project, out of all possible
security controls in a given standard. An end user can then change this list
accordingly, if needed. Each of these controls are described in a way that
allows a user with no experience with the given standard, to understand
what each security control mean and what they try to cover.
Step 5 - Checklist step The fifth step is where the chosen security
standard lists all the measures or requirements for each security control
that the end user selected from the confirmation step. These requirements
would be of a different nature depending on the standard. Both ASVS and
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ISO 27002 contain multiple suggestions for each security control that could
be listed in the checklist step. A management standard such as ISO 27001
might not have any direct requirements that could be listed in such a way.
The philosophy behind this step is to provide an end user with the
possibility of choosing the most relevant measures for the project, instead
of simply completing the process and here and list them all as required. The
checklist step is part of the reason why this thesis do not aim to provide
certification, as this would be in direct conflict with the intentions of this
step. Most standards, like ASVS, requires all measures for a given security
control to be implemented to be certified.
Step 6 - Print-screen step The final step is called the print-screen step.
This is because the only intention of this step is to provide an overview over
the measures or requirements chosen in the checklist step. This overview
can then be printed out or print screened if wanted, hence the name.
5.3 Security standard requirements
For the process to meet the goals of this thesis, the success criteria for
the process and the needs of the stakeholders, the security standards
implemented in this process have to meet a set of requirements.
The first requirement is that the standard cannot be so complex that
it would affect the efficiency of the process. One of the needs of an end
user is that the process has to be comprehensible, and too much required
information might make this difficult. Defining what makes a standard too
complex is difficult, and this is something that would have to be decided
by the designer of the process. This requirement is what might exclude
the ISO 27001 process, as it will probably prove difficult to implement it
without having to remove too much information.
The second requirement is that a standard has to provide measures or
requirements during the checklist step. For the ISO 27001 standard, this
could be the list of potential security clauses/categories that have to be
considered, while the 27002 standards could refer to the potential security
controls within each of these security clauses/categories.
Outside of these two requirements, any standard that is of relevance
to web applications can be implemented. The reason for this is that the
process does not necessarily aim to implement a standard word for word,
but rather use them as guidelines. The ISO/IEC 27001 is a standard that
is aimed at an entire organisation. However, small organisations can also
implement the practices found in this standard[33], which means that it
can be used for a small development team as well. This development
team would then represent a small organisation. Modifications like these
only apply to standards which require them, others, like ASVS can be
implemented as is, and allows the process to be used to achieve verification
through a third party.
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Chapter 6
The application
The fourth goal of this thesis states that an application should be
developed to implement the process described in the previous chapter.
The application is the attempt to accomplish this goal, and serves no other
purpose than to present the process in a manner which allows an end user
to interact with it. This application implemented the process with support
for one standard, namely the ASVS standard. ASVS were chosen due to
the relevancy of its contents to the evaluation environment the author had
access to. A version of the application that did not make it before the
evaluation had partially implemented the ISO 27002 code of practice as
a second option available to users.
This chapter will describe the success criteria for the application and
thought-process behind the presentation of each step in the application.
6.1 Success criteria of the application
1. The application is available to all major operating systems; Windows,
OSX and Linux.
2. The application do not require any formal knowledge of the applica-
tion itself to be usable.
In order for the application to target a wide audience, it needs to be
available on Windows, OSX and most Linux distributions. This reduces
the chance that a company might not be able to provide their employees
with the application, because it does not support the operating system they
use in their development environment.
As the application aims to guide the user through each step in the
process, the questions gradually become more detailed. Each of these
questions only require information about the project itself, and not the
security standard. This means that any member of a project should be able
to use the application, provided he or she has the necessary information
to answer the questions. If a user is unsure of a certain step or question,
there is a button that will inform the user why this specific option was
highlighted, or why this question is relevant to the process.
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6.2 Process description in the application
The following section described how the application implemented the
process, and the thought-process behind each step. The information found
here is different from section 5.2 in that it highlights the specific choices
made to implement the ASVS standard, and the help provided on each step
from the application. Each step in the application were named differently
than the six listed in the process description from section 5.2, as the idea
to give them a descriptive name were thought of after the evaluation had
been completed. The actual names used in the application are given in the
parenthesis after the descriptive names.
The descriptive names will be used in the description below, to avoid
any possible confusion.
Step 1 - User role step (Initial step) The end user encounters three
different panels, each containing a question. The key question in this step
is if the project is a web application step, as this notifies the process if the
ASVS standard is relevant to this user or not. This also tells the process that
ISO 27002 is relevant.
The final panel presents a list of technologies that can be used to
develop a web application. The intention behind this step were to
offer direct technical solutions on how to best implement the suggested
measures the user eventually encounters in the checklist step. This feature
did not make into the prototype application. Reasoning for this is found in
section 6.3
Each of the panels contain a button that tells the user why the question
asked in this panel is relevant to the process.
Step 2 - Security standard step (Step 1) The first panel that greets the
end user contain a check box with the ASVS standard already checked
if the key question from the user role step was answered with yes.
Beneath this option is the ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Standard. However, no
further implementation of this standard made it into the application due
to time constraints. The following steps therefore only contain information
regarding ASVS.
This panel also contains a button that explains why this standard was
selected.
The second panel in the security standard step contains a list of various
statements, accompanied by a check box. The statements describes various
scenarios or information that might be related to the project. The end user
can then select as many of these check boxes, and then press the submit
button to be taken to the next step. Each of these check boxes have a hidden
value of either 1, 2 or 3. These values are then counted, and the value that
is most represented is then chosen as the appropriate security level for this
project.
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Figure 6.1: Screen capture showing ISO 27002:2013 in an unreleased
prototype version of the application
Step 3 - Project step (Step 2) Judging by the statements that were chosen
from the security standard step, the application have selected a level of
verification that best suits these statements. There is also a button that
explains why this level were chosen for this project.
What follows are nine different panels, each containing a single
question that relates to a specific security requirement area. These
questions can be answered either “yes”, “no” or “uncertain”. “Yes”
and “uncertain” are both treated as a yes, difference being how they are
represented in the checklist step. Should an end user forget to answer one
of these questions, a warning will appear that prevents progression to the
next step.
Step 4 - Confirmation step (Step 3) The confirmation step presents the
end user with a panel that list all the security requirement areas taken from
the ASVS standard. Each of these areas have a related check box. Some of
these check boxes have already been selected if the end user answered yes
to any of the questions in the project step. The end user can then change
the values of these check boxes to checked or unchecked if necessary.
The security requirement areas found in the confirmation step are
described in a general way, allowing an end user with little to no experience
with the ASVS standard to understand what security controls they cover.
The panel containing this list also contains a button that explains why
some of the check boxes were already checked, and a button to submit the
data to the next step.
Step 5 - Checklist step (Step 4) The checklist step contains a single panel
that informs the end user of the chosen verification level, as well as a list
of each security requirement area that were selected in the confirmation
step. Each of the elements in this list can be clicked, which expands a drop-
down panel containing a new list. This new list contains all the measures
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for that specific security requirement area, with the given verification level.
Each measure can then be selected for inclusion in the report that will be
presented in the final step.
Above these elements is a text that briefly explains how the interactions
in this step works.
Step 6 - Print-screen step (Step 5) The print-screen step contains a single
panel that allows no interaction outside of reading the contents. This
panel simply lists the measures that were chosen in the checklist step, in
a simple numbered list. The end user can then use this list in whichever
way wanted.
6.3 Features that did not make it into the prototype
Several planned features were either scrapped during development or not
finished in time due to various reasons, such as time constraints or technical
difficulties. The most notable omission is the log-in functionality that
would allow an end user to store any previous run-through. This was
tried implemented, and a functional login system was implemented, but
the session data took too much time to implement for it to make it into
the application before the evaluation. Figure 6.2 shows a screen capture
of the state of this feature. A second major feature were an interactive
"flow-chart" that would show an end user the progress made, and how the
choices made during each step influenced the results, and how a different
answer could given a different result. The current prototype simply list
why certain elements were selected.
Of the features that did not make it into the application before the
evaluation, were some of the help buttons encountered during the process.
The “why is this relevant?” buttons encountered during the user role step
contains no information at this point. The description of each security
requirement area was also not written in time for the evaluation. Both
of these omissions had minor implications to the result of the evaluation,
which will be described at a later point.
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Figure 6.2: Screen capture showing the login and restore session data
feature
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Chapter 7
Architecture for the application
Choosing the right architecture for an application is not an easy decision.
Issues like performance, portability, availability, can it be reduced to
modules, how easy is it to maintain after release all vary based on
the technology used. In order to cover the first success criteria of the
application, the choice ended up with developing the application as a web
application. This made it easy to distribute, and meant that it would
run on any platform that could run a modern web browser, because the
technologies used to implement web applications supports availability and
portability. Web applications also require no installation or upgrades,
which allows an end user to simply focus on using the application. The
following sections will highlight the architectural choices made while
developing this prototype, why they were made and what alternatives
could been used instead, as well as a description of the process that was
implemented in the prototype application.
7.1 Architecture and technology
The web application was implemented using PHP, JavaScript, CSS and
regular HTML. Each step in the application is designed with a minimalistic
look. Buttons, forms, information panels all use a consistent theme to make
it easier to understand. If the submit button was blue in step 1, it’s blue in
step 2. Buttons that provide help or information have their own separate
color. The design also appears similar in nature on smaller devices like
cell-phones and tablets.
7.1.1 CSS & Twitter Bootstrap
Cascading Style Sheets, better known as CSS is a programming language
designed to change the look and formatting of an XML document[17]. It is
mostly used in relation to web pages written in HTML. CSS makes it easy
to maintain a consistent theme across the web application, which in turn
follows the design philosophies described in the previous chapter.
The front-end framework Twitter Bootstrap[5] was chosen to cut down
on the time spent on design. Twitter Bootstrap is a framework that consists
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of a large amount of CSS files and images. These make up various
components like buttons, panels, menus, etc. It is designed to make it easier
for web developers to create good looking websites that scale automatically
depending on the size of the user’s screen. This means that you can use the
prototype application on devices such as tablets and cell-phones.
7.1.2 PHP
PHP is a scripting language that is mostly used for web development. One
of the reasons PHP was chosen, was due to how it handles HTTP POST
and GET methods[18] , and the ability to save sessions. These methods are
used several times during the course of the web application, for instance
when a user submits one of the forms encountered during the process.
This information is used throughout the application to determine what
is relevant for this user, and has to be stored. The application first retrieves
the data using the GET method, and then save this information in a PHP
session object[19]. This session object allows a user to go back to a previous
step in the process and make changes if necessary.
The primary reason PHP was chosen, was because it was bundled in
the application called WampServer[20]. WampServer is a bundled web
development environment that installs Apache2, the server that allows
you to test your applications offline, the PHP framework and a MySQL
database for you. This allows for effortless testing locally, instead of having
to upload to a remote server each time somethings change.
7.1.3 JavaScript
Certain parts of the web application required features that would prove
to be overly complicated to solve in PHP. This was easily solved by
instead implementing them in JavaScript. Due to the nature of HTML,
combining JavaScript code with PHP proved to be easy. The main issue
that was solved in JavaScript was to allow the user to click on a security
area in the checklist step, which would in turn reveal a panel containing
all the measures. At first, it was partially solved using PHP, but the
implementation was buggy and half working at best. Manipulating CSS
code is an easy matter in JavaScript, which made the solution both work
better for the user, and easier to read for the developer.
7.1.4 Alternatives
At first, the plan was to use the same implementation process and
technology used at Finn.no. Reasoning being the author worked there
during the summer of 2014, and figured it would prove useful for an
eventual job application after completing the thesis. The back-end would
be written in Java, using Spring to handle web related features such as
deployment, dependency injection and RESTful services[21]. Combining
this with a tool known as Gradle, meant it would be easy to add any
external frameworks if needed[22]. Front-end would consists of mainly
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the same technologies as the current prototype, exception being PHP as
JavaScript would be enough to handle any front-end related scripting
issues. Twitter Bootstrap would also be used to handle design.
The main reason for not choosing this environment was due to several
problems that occurred while setting up the development environment.
Some of the frameworks did not work properly, and some did not work
at all. It was made clear that the effort to fix these problems simply were
not worth it, as it felt overly complicated for a rather simple prototype
application. The WampServer solution took 2 minutes to install, and could
be used immediately.
One of the advantages of using this alternative solution would be
for future development. Separating front-end and back-end into two
completely different modules means that it is easier for development teams
to work on them independently. Module based development also leads to
code that is easier to understand, because each module does exactly one
job. A random page of the current prototype application contains both
back-end and front-end related code, meaning a front-end developer have
to find the relevant bits of code manually. Using Gradle also lets each
developer add any framework they need, and the other developers could
simply update their project to download the requiring files automatically
to use this framework.
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Chapter 8
Demonstration
This chapter will present an example case that will be used to complete the
process, as it is presented in the application. The case that will be used for
this demonstration is: the application itself! During this chapter, "Project"
will refer this case. The end user in this case will be the author of this thesis,
who is also the developer of the application. Some of the features that were
eventually scrapped or not finished are included in this demonstration, to
provide some additional depth. The demonstration is written in a way that
makes fun of some of the bugs that the author did not manage to remove
in time for the evaluation.
The version of the application that is used for this demonstration is
located at http://fjoggs.com/old_site/master/. The author made a newer
version of the application that fixed quite a log of the bugs encountered
during this demonstration. The reasoning behind this was to provide the
same version of the application as the evaluation respondents were using
during the evaluation.
8.1 Project description
This section contains all the required information about the project that is
required to complete the process.
Project role The end user of this demonstration is a developer.
Description The development project is a web application project that
plan to implement the following features:
• Storing data in session objects.
• Allowing users to log in and out of the application.
• Usable on mobile devices.
• Implement a REST service that provides the application with inform-
ation from the security standards.
The technologies that will be used to implement this is:
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• Java 8
• Hibernate
• Spring
• Javascript
• Groovy
• Gradle
The project contains no senstive data of any sort, apart from usernames and
passwords that are created by the user when they want to register, allowing
them to store their run-throughs.
8.2 Run-through
We enter the URL given early, and are greeted by some text and a big blue
"improve my project". Our aim here is to indeed improve our project, so
we step right in. This takes us to the first step. For the sake of this thesis,
the names used in this demonstration corresponds with the names given in
chapter 5, and not the ones used in the prototype application.
Step 1 - User role step The first question that’s asked of us is what role we
have in our project. According to the description, we are a young and up-
and-coming developer, so we naturally select this option. We try to click
the "why is this relevant?" button, but nothing happens.
The next question is if the project we are working on is a web
application project. The given description does say that this is a web
application, so we say yes. Much to our disappointment, the button that
should tell us why this is relevant is not working.
The following panel lists a number of technologies, and asks if any of
these will be used to implement the project. Out of the technologies listed
in the description, we select the ones that are supported, and press submit.
Step 2 - Security standard step The first things that greets us in this step
is a checkbox with the label OWASP ASVS 2.0 Standard. This checkbox is
already checked off, and we press the “why did we check this button?” to
see why.
We un-check the checkbox to see what happens, which hides a panel
that contains a number of various statements that tries to describe our
project. We re-check the checkbox to make it appear again.
Out of all the various descriptions given, only the first two sounds
relevant to this project. There are no data outside of log in information that
could be categorized as sensitive. The examples given does sounds more
critical though, which makes the second description slightly confusing.
Onto the next step!
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Figure 8.1: Screen capture of the web application question.
Step 3 - Project step The next step, we’re greeted by a message that tells
us that the application have already selected an option for us. However, no
choice has been made. Undiscovered bug in the programming, perhaps?
Either way, we choose the option that sounds the closest to the description
of our project.
What follows are a series of questions that asks for details about the
project. Listed below are each of these questions and the answer given:
• Will your project use some form of authentication?
– Yes! The description states that users will be allowed to log in.
• Will your project store cookies at some point during the application’s
life cycle?
– No. The project will use session objects instead of cookies to save
data.
• Will some features only be available to certain users?
– No.
• Will your project use any kind of forms or user input fields?
– Yes! The project will asks their users a series of questions, which
needs forms to be stored in sessions.
• Will your project use RESTful services?
– Yes! The description states that all standard related information
will be fetched via a REST service.
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Figure 8.2: Screen capture of the list of technologies.
Figure 8.3: Screen capture of a relevant standard, and why it was selected.
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Figure 8.4: Screen capture of the project descriptions.
Figure 8.5: Screen capture of the chosen level.
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Figure 8.6: Screen capture of some of the ASVS areas in the confirmation
step.
• Should users be sent to custom error messages if something goes
wrong?
– Uncertain. The project description states no such thing, but
implementing error messages is good practice to help informing
users what went wrong.
• Will your project allow users to communicate with each other
internally?
– No.
• Will users perform any forms of transactions like payments on your
site?
– No.
• Are you planning to support mobile devices?
– Yes!
We press the submit button after we’re done answering the questions.
Step 4 - Confirmation step The confirmation steps reveals a panel that
contains a number of different checkboxes, that are either checked or not
checked. These checkboxes represents areas, according to text provided.
The five checkboxes that are already checked read "Authentication",
"Malicious Input Handling", "Cryptography at Rest", "Error Handling and
Logging" and "Mobile". These all match the description of our project, but
we feel that maybe the "Malicious Control" area should be included as well,
so we check it.
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Figure 8.7: Screen capture of the “include in report” feature of step 5.
Step 5 - Checklist step The chosen measures are represented in full in
Appendix C.
The application tell us that the following measures can be taken for our
chosen security level, which was level 1. We click on authentication to see
the measures for this area. The project description does not contain any
specific information on how the various features will be implemented, so
we choose all the measures as they seem relevant to this project.
There are no information about a database in the project description,
which means that the measures that handle SQL injection in the malicious
input handling area are not needed. Some of the various injections
presented handle topics that we are not familiar with. We choose therefore
to include them as we do not have the knowledge required to potentially
exclude them.
For the Cryptography at Rest area, nothing happens when we click the
area. We assume this means that no measures have to be taken for this
level. Error handling and logging have one measures that we include in
the final report.
The only measure we do not include from the mobile area is related to
storing data in an SQLite database.
The final area is the malicious controls. This only show one measure
which reads that “No measures needed for your chosen security level”.
This message did not show up for the cryptography at rest, which means
that maybe there was a second undiscovered bug in the application. The
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Figure 8.8: Screen capture of the “no measures” needed message.
Figure 8.9: Screen capture showing how the uncertain area was empty.
malicious control measure can still be included in the report, even though
it is not a measure. We chose to do so as we are rebels like that.
We note that even though we chose uncertain to whether or not we
wanted error handling, this area did not show up in the uncertain measures
area, but using the button that allows us to read the stored session data, we
see that it is stored in the uncertain array. A possible slip up in the coding
included it in the wrong area.
The amount of measures we selected totals to 15, if we exclude the joke
include of the no measures available.
Step 6 - Print-screen step We counted the amount of measures, because
the print-screen step shows four elements that contains no values, and that
the total actual measures presented to us counts 13, which means that two
are missing. We notice that the ones that are missing are the first measure
of each area, namely:
1. Verify all pages and resources require authentication except those
specifically intended to be public (Principle of complete mediation).
(a) From authentication.
2. Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to buffer
overflows, or that security controls prevent buffer overflows.
(a) From malicious input handling.
3. Verify that the application does not output error messages or
stack traces containing sensitive data that could assist an attacker,
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Figure 8.10: Screen capture showing that some measures were missing.
Figure 8.11: Screen capture showing a measure that should not be included
in the report.
including session id and personal information.
(a) From error handling and logging.
4. Verify that the client validates SSL certificates.
(a) From mobile.
What is also interesting is that both measures that were not selected to be
included in the report showed up anyway, which means that the actual
number of missing measures is four, which matches the four given above.
It’s clear that the logic that handled the inclusion is slightly off, and
that there is a good chance that the loop that handles the printing starts at
the wrong index. This is because the first element of each area were not
included. Why the measures that were not selected showed up anyway is
a different matter.
8.3 Conclusion
Throughout the application, several bugs were present that had some
influence on the outcome of this run-through. However, they did not
prevent the user from completing the process itself. The ramifications
of these bugs will be explained in further detail in chapter 12, and the
influence they might have had on the results of the evaluation.
What this demonstration did show was that the some of the statements
presented in the security standard step (step 2) related to the scale and size
of the project were obviously written for more complex projects than this,
which made it harder to choose the correct statements.
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Part III
Evaluation
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Chapter 9
Evaluation plan
The goal for the evaluation is to provide information that will help answer
the following questions:
• Have the goal of the problem statement presented in chapter 2 been
met?
• Have the success criteria for each artifact been achieved?
• Have the needs of each stakeholder been met?
• Have the goals of this thesis been accomplished?
This chapter will describe how the evaluation will try to answer these
questions.
Both artifacts are tested at the same time, using a prototype of the
application described in chapter 6. Once a respondent have completed the
run-through of the prototype application, a questionnaire is given out to
the respondent that has to be filled out. This is then followed by an oral
discussion among all the respondents and the observer.
The questionnaire used for the evaluation is provided in Appendix A,
Evaluation templates.
9.1 Who is the target audience
The target audience for both artifacts is a developer, or a team leader of
developers. They share the same interests in the development of the web
application. The developer is interested in a time efficient process, and
a security standard that have easily understandable measures. The team
leader uses the application as if he was a developer, to know what his team
is working with and being able to assist them if needed. A team leader can
also be a developer, as noted in the process description.
9.2 What evaluation strategy is used
The evaluation consists of a field study, held at a local development
company. More information about the environment for the field study is
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listed in chapter 10.
The field study will, with the help of a questionnaire, provide
information about the success of the process and the application. This
section will split the information into their own sub-tests, defined by
a question. Each of these tests were all conducted during the same
run-through, and are used simply to separate the results into relevant
categories.
9.3 Evaluation description
Each of these cases will be referred to as their own separate sections in the
evaluation results. The question each case asks do not refer to a specific
question in the questionnaire, but rather an overall question that can be
answered by combining some of the questions from the questionnaire.
Case 1 - Did the respondents spend enough time on security before
deployment? Related to the first goal of this thesis. The goal is to
determine, as said, if the company used for this evaluation spent enough
time on security before they deployed their project. "Enough time" will be
defined based on what the respondent answers.
Case 2 - Could this process be used before development begun to prevent
some of the issues they might have faced? Related to the second goal of
this thesis.
Case 3 - Did the process provide any security standards relevant to the
project? Related to the first success criteria for the process.
Case 4 - Did the security standard provide any measures relevant to the
project? Related to the third goal of this thesis, and the second need of
the end user.
Case 5 - Did this process make it easier to use security standards?
Related to the sixth goal of this thesis.
Case 6 - Could this process be used in your company? Related to the
first and third need of the company.
Case 7 - Did the lack of experience with the application hinder the
respondent in any way? Related to the second success criteria of the
application, the third need of the company and the fifth goal of this thesis.
Case 8 - Did the lack of experience with the security standard hinder the
respondent in any way? Related to the first and third need of the end
user, and the second success criteria of the process.
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9.4 Evaluation procedure overview
What follows is a short description of how the evaluation was done, written
in the perspective of the author, hereby referred to as the observer, as the
one doing the evaluation.
After a short round of introductions, the observer starts off with a
presentation. This presentation talks about the master thesis, followed by
the ASVS standard and how it relates to the security issues the company
of the respondents might face. Lastly, the presentation talks about how the
evaluation will be completed, and what happens in the weeks that follow.
After the presentation is completed, the respondents, with the help of
the observer, agree on a project they can use for this evaluation. Once
an agreement have been met, each respondent is presented with the URL
that the prototype application resides on, and they start the process. Once
each respondent have completed this process, they receive a questionnaire
from the observer that they fill out with no communication between the
respondents or the observer.
When they are finished filling out the questionnaire, a short oral
discussion follows, related to their experience with the process and the
application.
59
60
Chapter 10
Evaluation environment
The evaluation were conducted at a major software development company
called Finn.no, residing in Oslo, Norway. According to their web-pages,
every Norwegian spends on average 21 hours each year using their
services[23]. FINN.no’s main service is what they call "torget", which
translates to "the marketplace". This is a service where users can, amongst
other things, buy and sell items they no longer have need for. The
marketplace is in short a localised version of eBay[24], where both private
customers and companies can sell their merchandise at a fixed price, or to
the highest bidder.
FINN.no’s services operate on the web, through various web applica-
tions that handle all the logistics that is needed to run a web site of this
magnitude. Due to sheer size of their user base and the amount of sensit-
ive and critical data that a marketplace contain, FINN.no is a good place to
conduct an evaluation of the artifacts presented in this thesis.
10.1 Respondents
The 4 respondents that all work for the same development team at
FINN.no, with different roles within this team.
Respondent 1 Respondent number 1 is a current lead developer at
FINN.no, and holds a degree of bachelor in informatics. Respondent 1 has
19 years of relevant experience, but have no prior knowledge of security
standards, including ASVS, and seldom works with security related issues
in general.
Respondent 2 Number 2 is a senior developer at FINN.no with 15 years
of relevant experience, and graduated with a master of science. Unlike the
first respondent, respondent 2 works with security related issues, and have
some experience with security standards. Even though he has experience
with OWASP, respondent number 2 have no prior knowledge of the ASVS
security standard.
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Respondent 3 The third respondent is the current team leader, who
previously worked as a developer for the same team. Graduated with a
master of science in systems engineering, and have 15 years of relevant
experience. Respondent number 3 do not work with security related issues,
and have no experience with either ASVS or any security standard in
general.
Respondent 4 The last respondent is a developer, who has built up 10
years of relevant experience after graduating with a master of science in IT.
Number 4 rarely spends time working on security related issues, and have
no prior knowledge of any security standard, including ASVS.
10.2 Case description
The project that is used for evaluation of the process and the prototype
application, is a project all four respondents worked on at a previous time.
This project was a web application development project that implemented
a search engine for airline travels. An end user of this service would submit
information about the travel, such as where and when. This data would
then be forwarded to the travel agencies in real time, which would then
send relevant information to the user. This was achieved by collecting flight
data from almost 30 different suppliers, and then represent this data to an
end user in a manner which made it understandable. This information
could then be filtered, based on a number of different parameters, such as
location or price. The user can then decide which of the offers represented
is the most desirable, and click a link that leads to the third party supplier
where the user could buy this ticket.
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Chapter 11
Evaluation results
The following chapter highlights the results of evaluation in relation
to each artifact. The sections in this chapter attempts to provide the
information, related to the goals of this thesis. These results are taken from
the observations made during the evaluation, and the answers from the
questionnaire given by the respondents. Most of the data provided is taken
directly from the answers of the respondents.
11.1 Case 1
Did the respondents spend enough time on security before deployment?
A common theme among the respondents was that they either spent no
time, or close to no time on security related issues before development
begun on the project. This was also the case during development. The main
reason for this is that Finn.no usually dealt with security related issues by
hiring external advisers that would test the application for any threats,
and then potentially solve them. This means that the developers had
no responsibility in relation to security. However, each respondent have
years of experience with development in general, and they have acquired
knowledge regarding how to handle certain situations. Most noticeably is
any database related work that handle SQL statements would use some
form of prepared statement to prevent SQL injection.
All four respondents mentioned in the questionnaire that the process
suggested measures that they did not think about, and they did experience
security related issues after development.
11.2 Case 2
Could this process be used before development begun to prevent some
of the issues they might have faced? All four respondents reported that
the process suggested measures that they did not previously think about
during development. One respondent specifically mentioned that they
had problem related to cross-site scripting (XSS)[12], and that the process
provided a suggested measure to take to solve this problem. The same
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respondent also noted that the security measures related to mobile phones
would been useful during development of the project.
The process did not however, present the one of the respondents
with any measures related to a DOS-attack or SQL injection, which they
experienced after deployment. A second respondent however, noted that
the process did recommend measures against SQL injection.
This is interesting, as shown during the demonstration, the security
requirement area related to Malicious input handling contains a measure
that is related to SQL injection, as well as the Mobile security requirement
area.
11.3 Case 3
Did the process provide any security standards relevant to the project?
The prototype application, as mentioned earlier did only include one
standard. The author knew that this standard would suit some of the
projects the respondents have completed, as he spent a summer as in
intern working with web application related development. Neither of the
respondent had any experience with ASVS.
11.4 Case 4
Did the security standard provide any measures relevant to the project?
The respondents wrote that the process recommended measures that they
already had implemented, and a few noted that it also recommended some
measures that they did not yet implement or think about.
11.5 Case 5
Did this process make it easier to use security standards? All four
respondents had no previous experience with security standards, but
managed to complete the process mostly without problems.
11.6 Case 6
Could this process be used in your company? Most of the respondents
noted that the process and application presented to them during the
evaluation could most probably be used in the company, but one of the
respondents suggested that if not the entire company then maybe allow
each development team decide on whether or not to use them.
11.7 Case 7
Did the lack of experience with the application hinder the respondent
in any way? The application did not provide enough help for in-
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experienced users for them to fully understand each question, but they
did complete the process without help. This would mean that some of the
security requirement areas presented to the user might not be relevant, or
that the security level is wrong because they did not completely understand
the question or the statements given. During the oral discussion, it was
noted that the list of security requirement areas during the confirmation
step were too technical in nature, and should instead be a general
description of what each covered. This was a problem noticed even before
evaluation, but it was sadly not implemented in time.
The prototype application did not have any help buttons implemented,
and it is clear that this is a feature that would be required if the application
is to be used in a development company. This is something that was noted
during the demonstration as well.
11.8 Case 8
Did the lack of experience with the security standard hinder the
respondent in any way? Two of the respondents had some problems
understanding all of the questions. Reasoning was that they had little
experience with security and security standards, and that there was a lack
of explanation. One respondent reported that some information about why
these measures will be effective and against what, could help explain them
more easily.
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Chapter 12
Reliability & validity of
evaluation
The following sub-sections are some of the most important sections in
this thesis. Recognizing any potential factors that could compromise the
evaluation is the key to an accurate conclusion. Random events could
interfere with the evaluation in a way that would lead to a different result,
had there been a re-evaluation. One of the main factors in potential threats
to the evaluation is the fact that the evaluation is only performed once,
several months before the completion of the thesis. The problems that this
cause will be highlighted in the following sections
12.1 Random elements & non-random elements
Determining what factors were coincidences, and which were not makes it
easier to confirm or deny any of the points made in the previous 2 sections.
Too many random elements weakens the reliability of the evaluation, as it
means there is a good chance a re-evaluation would provide a completely
different result.
The following factors during this evaluation could be deemed ran-
dom/coincidental:
• Performance related to prototype application.
• Respondents, see section 12.2 for further elaboration.
When developing an application on any level, unforeseen elements and
bugs always happens. There has been no form of QA (quality assurance)
work done on the prototype application or process before this evaluation.
This means that bugs might occur during the evaluation, which could affect
the outcome of this evaluation. The best way to minimize the outcome of
these situations are simply to conduct more evaluations. Sadly there were
no time for a second evaluation.
The following factors are deemed not random/not coincidental:
• How easy to use the prototype application is.
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• Relevance of the ASVS security standard.
• Evaluation environment, see section 12.2 for further elaboration.
• Relevance of questionnaire, see section 12.3 for further elaboration.
12.2 Evaluation environment & respondents
Biggest factor to the results of an evaluation is the environment in which it
was performed. The previous section deemed this a non coincidental factor
to the evaluation. This is mainly due to the fact that the observer is the one
engaging a company for a possible evaluation, meaning there is a degree of
control. What is coincidental, is the respondents that a company allows
to participate in the evaluation. These respondents may have previous
experience in the relevant fields, or no experience at all. This can have
ramifications on the answers given in the questionnaire.
In this specific evaluation, the observer contacted one of the eventual
respondents directly, and not the company itself. This meant that at least
one of the respondents would be decided beforehand, and the rest would
most likely be co-workers who had worked with this respondent. The
random factor in this specific case would be what role each respondent
had in the project that was used for the evaluation.
The company that participated in the evaluation were a good target
for this thesis, because in this specific evaluation case they did not
spend any time on security before implementing. If the evaluation had
been performed at a company where planning and designing secure
web applications from the ground up were common practice, then the
immediate success the artifacts presented in this thesis would seem
doubtful at best. It is important to recognise these factors before concluding
anything, and use them to highlight that any form of evaluation is subject
to variance.
12.3 Questionnaire & case correlation
One of the issues that arose after evaluation was related to the question-
naire and their correlation with the success criteria for each artifact. One
of the artifacts, namely the first artifact, were conceived after evaluation
already had taken place, meaning there were no direct questions related to
this artifact in the evaluation. The success of this artifact therefore had to
be interpreted from the questions that were aimed to answer the other arti-
facts. As mentioned in section 7.7, the evaluation were performed several
months before the completion of this thesis. The success criteria for the ar-
tifacts saw some slight re-iterations during this time, meaning that some of
the questions from the questionnaire might have lost some of its accuracy
related to these criteria. These changes were kept to a minimum though, as
the evaluation would prove pointless, had the criteria changed drastically.
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12.4 Would a re-evaluation provide similar results
Due to the simplicity of the prototype application, a re-evaluation would
most likely end up with close to similar results. This assumes that the
evaluation case and environment would remain the same. Much of the
success related to the standard were the revelation that all four respondents
noted that the application presented them with measures they had not
previously thought about. Had they used a different project where this
had not happened, it would definitely affect the outcome of the evaluation
results. This indicates that ideally there should have been more than one
evaluation to strengthen the conclusion of this thesis. This section have to
be taken with a grain of salt, as it is merely speculation. Judging whether
or not a re-evaluation would prove the same results is next to impossible,
as there are things you do not think about that could happen. Murphy’s
law springs to mind.
12.5 Strength of ASVS implementation
The implementation of ASVS in the process can affect the outcome of the
evaluation. Some of the descriptions listed in the second step to determine
the level of verification, are poorly written, which could lead to users either
using a level higher than they should, or worse, a level below. Combine this
with the questions asked in the step after, and you could end up missing
some measures. The only way to prevent this would be to conduct more
evaluations that could help define these questions and descriptions better.
12.6 Shortcomings of ASVS
ASVS in itself might also not be best suited to demonstrate the power of
the approach the process in this thesis attempts. The best way to determine
this would be to conduct more evaluations, with different respondents and
a different environment.
12.7 Conclusion
The author deems the most significant factor in the outcome of this thesis
is the low number of respondents that participated in the evaluation. Four
is an incredibly small amount if you relate it to empirical evidence that
uses statistics to prove or disprove a statement. Even with a large sample
size, an evaluation such as this will always be subject to the quality of
the respondents, and when the number is as low as four, the outcome of
the evaluation depends largely on chance. Any conclusions made after
these results are therefore closer to a guideline or as a map of the general
response, and not an absolute conclusion.
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Part IV
Conclusion
71

Chapter 13
Summary & conclusion
This thesis has tried to supply some background information on why
security is important, and how to use what already exists to improve
security. The artifacts presented in part II tried to achieve this by creating
a process that would provide an end user with measures taken from a
relevant security standard.
The problem statement presented in chapter 2 helped shaped the goals
of this thesis. The following section will attempt to deconstruct these goals
into smaller goals, and verify to what degree they have been accomplished,.
13.1 Discussion of the evaluation results
Evaluate whether or not development companies spend enough time
on security before deploying a web application to the public The
evaluation results revealed that the company and respondents used in
the evaluation did not spend any time on security before they begun
developing the project. As noted, this was partially due to how that
company uses external advisers to help with security. However, they did
experience security related issues after deployment, which might indicate
that these advisers either did not do a sufficient job, or the issues were
outside of their domain.
The background information also revealed how Sony would in some
cases rush out products to the public, which in turn was one of the reasons
why the 2011 Sony security breach caused so much damage.
Drawing a conclusion for an entire industry based on two different
scenarios is foolish, but what these scenarios show is that some develop-
ment companies do not spend enough time to prevent their services from
being affected by security related issues. For the company used in the eval-
uation, they experienced DOS attacks, while the attack on Sony resulted in
77 million compromised user accounts.
Design a process that can be used early in the planning stages of a
development project In order to determine the success of this goal, we
list the success criteria for the process taken from section 5.1:
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1. The process provides an end user with standards related to their role
within a project.
Mentioned in the evaluation result was that the prototype application
used for the evaluation did only offer one security standard, and that
this standard was chosen due to the relevancy with the evaluation
environment. The outcome of this criteria can therefore not be determined.
2. An end user do not require any prior knowledge to any of these
security standards.
The current process implemented the measures and security requirement
areas of the ASVS standard as they were written in the standard. The
questions that lead to the process suggestions were designed by the author
to make it as easy as possible to end up with the “correct” results. What
occurred in evaluation case 2 was that one of the respondents did not get
any SQL injection related measures, while a different respondent did. This
might suggest that some of the questions asked during the process did not
describe the related security requirement area good enough
3. The process is precise enough to provide two different users from a
project, sharing the same role, with close to identical suggestions.
The previous criteria noted how this did in fact not happen, and that
process were not precise enough to avoid the situation that happened
during the evaluation.
4. The process can be used before any implementation has begun.
The project that were used for the evaluation, were an already completed
project. Drawing any conclusions based off this related to how early the
process can be used would therefore be pointless. However, what the
evaluation showed was that the standard presented the respondents with
measures that they could have used during implementation. This indicates
that the process can be used at a later stage as well.
Chapter 8 showed a demonstration of the process, using the project de-
scription of the application this thesis produced itself. This demonstration
showed how you could complete the process without having to know spe-
cifics about how the project will be implemented. The user role step al-
lowed an end user to list the technologies that might be used to implement
the project, but it was not mandatory to progress to the next step.
Provide security measures from a standard deemed relevant by the
process This goal was met during the evaluation, as all four respondents
experienced that the process provided measures that were relevant to their
project. As long as a project that attempt to use the process and prototype
application is a web application, the ASVS standard should provide some
form of measures that would relate to that project.
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Allow the process to be expanded upon, providing more coverage
The process chapter attempted to highlight the possibilities to allow for
expansion of other security standards, and not just development standards.
How successful this implementation would be is hard to judge without
actually doing it.
Develop an application that implements this process in an efficient
manner The time spent completing the process for the project described
in section 10.2 summed up to around 30 minutes. While this does not
necessarily mean that the application is efficient, it shows that for a project
of moderate size, the process can be completed in a reasonable amount of
time. Noted in the evaluation case 7 was that the lack of help on certain
steps lead to some confusion.
In addition to this goal, are the success criteria related to the application:
1. The application is available to all major operating systems; Windows,
OSX and Linux.
This was achieved by implementing the application as a web application,
which allowed it to be used on most web browsers.
2. The application do not require any formal knowledge of the applica-
tion itself to be usable.
Mentioned earlier was that implementing the help buttons should improve
the user experience for users that have not used the application before.
Reduce the complexity of using security standards in development As
mentioned earlier, drawing a conclusion to a goal like this from a single
evaluation is unwise. However, the evaluation revealed that not a single
respondent had any experience with security standards, but they were
provided with some measures that they agreed on and understood.
What this process does is that it tries to exclude all the non relevant
information from a security standard, providing only the information that
is related to this end users interests and the projects interests. What
the questionnaire from the evaluation showed was that the idea behind
the process had promise, and if expanded upon could be used in a
development company today.
13.2 Conclusion of this thesis
The general consensus of the previous section is that both the process and
the application show promise, but are in need of improvement. Many of
the goals and criteria were met either fully, or to some degree, but under
circumstances that does not allow to use that as a conclusion, but rather as
an indication. Chapter 12 attempt to highlight what factors can affect the
outcome of this conclusion.
The goals the author consider to be met fully are:
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• Goal 2: Design a process that can be used early in the planning stages
of a development project.
• Goal 3: Provide security measures from a standard deemed relevant
by the process.
• Goal 4: Allow the process to be expanded upon, providing more
coverage.
Goals met to some degree:
• Goal 1: Evaluate whether or not development companies spend
enough time on security before deploying a web application to the
public.
• Goal 5: Develop an application that implements this process in an
efficient manner.
• Goal 6: Reduce the complexity of using security standards in
development.
The standard used for the evaluation, ASVS, were not complicated
enough to reveal if this type of process could simplify it. A standard such
as ISO 27001 would be a better fit to draw any conclusions for this.
One of the possible additions to improve the results of the evaluation
would be to expanding the amount of standards supported in the process
would better highlight how well the step-by-step process simplify the use
of a security standard in web application development.
The problem statement said that the process created by this thesis
should help to prevent security breaches or minimise the damage they
could inflict. The author of this thesis recognise that any conclusion based
on the small amount of empirical data this thesis produced should be taken
with a grain of salt. With this in mind, the discussion and results presented
in previous section indicates that this statement has been fulfilled to some
degree, IF you assume that the security standards implemented in this
process can accomplish these goals.
All in all, the author of this thesis is pleased with the direction and
results this thesis have achieved. He is not pleased with the low amount
of evaluation that the application and process received, but things do not
always go as planned. The idea of simplifying a security standard to make
it easier for people to use them is an idea that have been received by others
as highly interesting. The author himself believe that this idea could be
very successful if it was developed by a serious development company.
13.3 Future work
Mentioned several times through the course of this thesis is the need for
more than one evaluation. This would make it easier to evaluate whether
or not the three goals that were not fully met, actually were met or not.
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A second standard would have to be implemented into the process
before a re-evaluation, such as the ISO 27002 standard. Work on this had
already begun before the conclusion of this thesis, however, there were
simply not enough time to complete it.
In order to meet all the needs of the stakeholders, the application would
have to be further developed. The login feature that were not completed in
time, and the restore session data are the most pressing.
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Appendix A
Evaluation templates
A.1 Questionnaire for the respondents
1. Where do you work?
2. What is your current role within the company?
3. What is your academic degree?
4. Years of relevant experience (Software development, security, stand-
ards)?
5. Do you work with security related issues?
6. Do you have any experience with security standards?
7. If yes, which ones?
8. Do you have any experience with the ASVS Security Standard?
9. Write a short description of the project used in this evaluation:
10. How much time was spent on security related issues?
11. Any security issues after deployment?
12. If yes, did the application present you with any measures that you
could have taken to prevent it?
13. What was/is your role for this project?
14. Based on your experience with this particular project:
(a) Did this prototype recommend security measures that you
previously did not think about?
(b) Did you miss any recommendations of any security measures
that you find relevant?
(c) Which of the recommended security measures did you identify
in your project at a later stage?
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(d) Were the questions you encountered in step 2 relevant to this
project?
15. Is implementing web applications according to a security standard
something you would consider for your future development projects?
16. Is this application something you think the company you work for
would use?
17. What are the main benefits of this approach?
18. What were the main challenges you faced while using this approach?
19. Any further comments?
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Appendix B
Prototype application
availability
The prototype application used for both the demonstration and the
evaluation is found at http://fjoggs.com/old_site/master.
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Appendix C
Measures included in the
report for the demonstration
C.1 Authentication
1. Verify all pages and resources require authentication except those
specifically intended to be public (Principle of complete mediation).
(a) Included in report.
2. Verify all password fields do not echo the user’s password when it is
entered.
(a) Included in report.
3. Verify all authentication controls are enforced on the server side.
(a) Included in report.
4. Verify all authentication controls fail securely to ensure attackers
cannot log in.
(a) Included in report.
C.2 Malicious input handling
1. Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to buffer
overflows, or that security controls prevent buffer overflows.
(a) Included in report.
2. Verify that all input validation failures result in input rejection.
(a) Included in report.
3. Verify that all input validation or encoding routines are performed
and enforced on the server side.
(a) Included in report.
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4. Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to SQL
Injection, or that security controls prevent SQL Injection.
(a) Excluded from report.
5. Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to LDAP
Injection, or that security controls prevent LDAP Injection.
(a) Included in report.
6. Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to OS Com-
mand Injection, or that security controls prevent OS Command Injec-
tion.
(a) Included in report.
7. Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to XML
External Entity attacks or that security controls prevents XML
External Entity attacks.
(a) Included in report.
8. Verify that the runtime environment is not susceptible to XML
Injections or that security controls prevents XML Injections.
(a) Included in report.
9. Verify that all untrusted data that are output to HTML (including
HTML elements, HTML attributes, JavaScript data values, CSS
blocks, and URI attributes) are properly escaped for the applicable
context.
(a) Included in report.
C.3 Cryptography at REST
No measures for this security level.
C.4 Error handling and logging
1. Verify that the application does not output error messages or
stack traces containing sensitive data that could assist an attacker,
including session id and personal information.
(a) Included in report.
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C.5 Mobile
1. Verify that the client validates SSL certificates.
(a) Included in report.
2. Verify that unique device ID (UDID) values are not used as security
controls.
(a) Included in report.
3. Verify that the mobile app does not store sensitive data onto shared
resources on the device (e.g. SD card or shared folders).
(a) Included in report.
4. Verify that sensitive data is not stored in SQLite database on the
device.
(a) Excluded from the report.
C.6 Malicious controls
No measures for this security level.
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